A ruling by the International Court of Justice on Thursday made Myanmar the first country to be judged responsible for genocide. Previously, only individuals had been found guilty of the crime. But the court ruled, in a case brought by Gambia, that actions of Myanmar’s security forces against the minority Muslim Rohingya people in northern Rakhine State, in 2017, constituted genocide.
The evidence included horrific testimony by victims and voluminous reporting by U.N. fact-finding missions. That testimony in the courtroom in The Hague was as shocking to me as anything I have heard over three decades as an independent lawyer involved in human rights matters and as a commentator on them. I have never heard a judgment that needed so long — nearly three hours — to be read.
The decision, by nine of the 15 judges, strikes a blow for the rule of law as much as in any international case in which I have been involved. It reinforces the legal meaning and practical effect of the term, which has been deeply contested — as reflected by the six sharply dissenting judges, who argued that Myanmar may have committed human rights violations and war crimes, but not genocide. The debate over the meaning of the term, both within the court and in public discourse, will no doubt continue as the court addresses the other genocide case before it: South Africa’s claim that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza.
The word genocide was coined in 1944 by the émigré Polish jurist Raphael Lemkin, who created an amalgam of the Greek word “genos” (“tribe or race”) and the Latin-derived suffix “cide”(“killing”) to create a new crime under international law, with the goal of protecting groups. His persistence brought the term into the Nuremberg trials in 1945, but only as an example of a war crime. That tribunal’s failure to mention the term in its rulings, largely because of American concerns that it might be used against the United States by Native and Black Americans, caused Lemkin to describe the day of judgment as “the blackest” of his life.
Three years later, largely through his efforts, the United Nations adopted the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The convention committed signatories to prevent and punish “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” (The United States ratified the convention only in 1988.) The convention’s definition set a higher bar than Lemkin had proposed for proving the crime by imposing the additional requirement of proving there was an intention to destroy protected groups.
The term came back to the fore with the atrocities of the 1990s in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. It captured public attention as the labels of war crimes and crimes against humanity did not, though in international law, there is no hierarchy between the crimes. In 2007, the International Court of Justice ruled that the murder of 8,000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys by Bosnian Serb forces in the town of Srebrenica in 1995 was a genocide. However, because the court ruled, controversially, that the crimes were perpetrated by Serbian paramilitary groups not under the direction of governmental authorities in Belgrade, Serbia was found to be responsible only for failing to prevent a genocide, not for committing one.
In reaching that conclusion, the court further raised the bar: Proving genocide could be based on a pattern of conduct if the only reasonable inference to be drawn from such conduct was genocidal intent. This narrow legal definition differs from the way the term is generally used in public discourse — simply the killing of large numbers of people who belong to one group. It caused the International Court of Justice to rule, in another case that I argued, that killings in Vukovar, Croatia, were not genocide.
In its arguments in the Rohingya case, Gambia relied on the high standard set by the court in its earlier cases: Taking into account the pattern of conduct, is genocidal intent the only inference that could reasonably be drawn from the acts in question?
The court concluded that it was. In meticulous detail, it examined the evidence before it and considered Myanmar’s arguments that it was possible to reasonably infer other intentions, namely counterinsurgency operations, forcible displacement and punishment.
The majority disagreed, ruling that executions of men and boys, mass rape, the killing of children, the destruction of villages and attacks on fleeing civilians, according to “credible” accounts, were not hallmarks of other intentions. The court’s conclusion is compelling, and the approach offered by the dissenters — that the majority has somehow lowered the court’s standard — is not persuasive.
In this case, the court found itself in a different situation from earlier Serbian and Croatian cases, when it could piggyback off prior factual findings by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia about culpability. Here, the court had to roll up its sleeves and address the evidence without the assistance of an earlier judicial ruling. That is what is different: The court had to assess the facts on its own, and it did so, very persuasively.
It was not intimidated by an apparent threat by the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations to the effect that the court risked sanctions along the lines of those imposed by the United States on the International Criminal Court if it weakened the standard for proving genocide. If anyone has sought to weaken that standard it is the Trump administration, with its implausible claim that South Africa has somehow committed genocide against white farmers. The court has not weakened anything. It has done no more than apply its “only reasonable inference” standard to the facts of this case.
What might the Myanmar ruling mean for other cases? If the minority’s approach had prevailed, South Africa’s case against Israel would likely have hit a brick wall. This is because Israel argues that its actions in Gaza were intended as acts of counterterrorism, so the only reasonable inference could not be that its intention was to destroy a group. In the Rohingya case, the court swatted away Myanmar’s analogous argument of counterinsurgency. It ruled that the totality of the evidence in this case established genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference. South Africa will thus have the burden of meeting that same intent standard.
The court has shown itself to be robust and independent in the face of threats, and resolute in the exercise of its judicial function, interpreting and applying the 1948 convention to give real meaning to protections promised to individuals and groups. The court’s judgment gives Raphael Lemkin’s efforts practical effect. For it to have ruled otherwise would have consigned the genocide convention to irrelevance.
Philippe Sands is a professor of law at University College London, a visiting professor of law at Harvard Law School and the author of “East West Street: On the Origins of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity.” He was counsel for Gambia in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice. This article originally appeared in The New York Times.
