It is hard not to rejoice while watching images of ecstatic Syrians toppling statues from the regime of the deposed dictator Bashar al-Assad and hearing the shouts of joy of prisoners, many of whom may have been tortured and starved, released from his dungeons. Mr. al-Assad’s Syria was brutal for the regime’s opponents, and 13 years of civil war and a kleptocratic regime made life dangerous and miserable for ordinary Syrians. In addition to striking a blow for human freedom, Mr. al-Assad’s fall also removes an Iranian-backed, anti-American and anti-Israel dictator from the Middle East chessboard.
And yet it is hard not to also feel uneasy. Having watched similar images of Afghans freed from the Taliban’s violent rule in 2001 and jubilant Iraqis in 2003 after the fall of Saddam Hussein, one worries that Syrians’ sense of deep relief today could be followed by a new set of horrors tomorrow.
One of the biggest uncertainties facing Syrians and the country’s neighbors is the true nature of their liberators. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (H.T.S.) has led the latest round of anti-regime offensives to victory, and it is now the dominant player among the diverse opposition that formed against Mr. al-Assad over his 24 years in power. The United States has designated H.T.S. and its leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, as terrorists; there is even a $10 million price on Mr. Jolani’s head.
H.T.S., like the Islamic State, grew out of Jabhat al-Nusra, which in turn emerged from Al Qaeda in Iraq. Mr. Jolani was initially loyal to Al Qaeda when ISIS split from it but, in 2016, he publicly rejected the organization and formed H.T.S. a year later. Mr. Jolani has repeatedly stated that he opposes foreign terrorist attacks and rejects an ISIS-type caliphate, and in H.T.S.-controlled areas he has tried to suppress fighters loyal to Al Qaeda and ISIS. This is encouraging, but it is also possible that the H.T.S. leader has merely been pragmatic, turning against these groups temporarily in a bid for power, and could be willing to work with them once again in the future.
How whatever government takes shape will govern Syria’s diverse population is another open question. Mr. Jolani has told Christian, Druse, and other minority leaders that they are free to worship, but his followers remain committed to an extreme version of Islam, and the group’s track record is mixed. The U.S. State Department reports that H.T.S. has committed human rights abuses against minorities and seized the property of displaced Christians. In parts of the country that have been under its control, H.T.S. has placed limits on public displays of Christianity, even when it tolerated Christian worship.
Even if H.T.S. itself reins in its most extreme elements, the Islamic State may grow in power. Well before the latest offensive, the Islamic State was on pace in 2024 to double its number of attacks in Iraq and Syria during 2023. It now has an estimated 2,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria, with established training camps in remote areas. Thousands of Islamic State fighters are also detained in Syria, and some may be released. As various opposition groups scramble for power, the Islamic State may gain more territory and freedom for its operations.
It’s unclear whether H.T.S. will be able to consolidate power, cooperate with rivals, and form a stable government. It is the strongest opposition group in Syria now, but it is not the only one. The United States has long worked with the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces to fight the Islamic State, maintaining around 900 troops there. The S.D.F. seized more territory as regime forces fell apart, and in other parts of the country, local militias also took advantage of the chaos. A unified government may emerge from all this, but in the short term at least it is more likely that different groups will dominate different parts of the country and, if the past is any guide, may end up turning their guns on one another in the struggle for power.
It is possible that H.T.S. and the other militia groups, as well as local residents, could take revenge on Mr. al-Assad’s supporters and minority communities, especially the Alawites, who made up the core of the Assad regime. To bolster his power, Mr. al-Assad assembled a coalition of Alawite, Christian, Druse, and other minorities to offset the demographic strength of the country’s Sunni Muslim majority. Now that power in much of the country is back in Sunni hands, the once-marginalized may turn on those they see as their former oppressors. It’s happened before: In 2003, Iraqis began to hunt down members of the Baath Party whom they blamed for the regime’s atrocities. Syrians have good reason to hate the people who tortured and oppressed them, but in these situations it is too often innocent family and community members, not the truly guilty, who are punished.
If chaos, revenge, and infighting consume parts of Syria, the humanitarian situation may get worse, not better. The war has led to almost seven million people displaced within Syria and over five million refugees. The good news is that many of those refugees, who have been living in Turkey, Lebanon, and other countries, may return, but communities linked to Mr. al-Assad may flee en masse if they are targeted. They will need help in their host countries, which are already strained, while those returning will come home to destroyed cities and a defunct economy that will take decades to rebuild.
The world, however, is in no mood to help. On Saturday, President-elect Donald Trump tweeted, “DO NOT GET INVOLVED!” The wars in Ukraine, Sudan and Gaza all demand the world’s resources, and Western governments will be particularly leery of working with H.T.S., even for humanitarian reasons.
Although humanitarian support will likely be limited, the instability of Syria is likely to lead to military action by other governments in the region as they jockey to reposition themselves. Both Iran and Russia are withdrawing their forces, making it easier for other states to operate and furthering the power vacuum in the country. Turkey is particularly concerned about the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces and may act militarily to weaken them. And Israel will almost certainly fear that the Assad regime, the devil it knew, will be replaced by a new force that may be less deterrable. Indeed, Jolani is the H.T.S. leader’s nom de guerre, highlighting his ties to the Golan Heights that was once part of Syria and that Israel annexed in 1981. Israelis may also worry that Hezbollah or other Iranian-linked organizations will take advantage of the situation to conduct operations against Israel.
All this will make it harder for any government to control the country and impose order.
If the outgoing and incoming administrations in Washington want to avoid more regional proxy wars, a new humanitarian crisis and a potential terrorist haven, the next few months should involve careful diplomacy while maintaining — and ideally increasing — the U.S. military presence in the area. U.S. leaders should work with allies to press H.T.S. on its commitment to stopping terrorism and ensuring human rights, work with regional partners like Turkey and Israel to discourage their meddling, and coordinate a broad humanitarian response.
We all can hope that Syria is putting its horrific past behind it, but hope is not a policy. Brutal regimes and devastating civil wars have long legacies. A focused U.S. effort can alleviate some of Syria’s problems, even if it cannot solve them completely.
Daniel Byman is the director of the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at CSIS and a professor in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. This article originally appeared in The New York Times.
