In the midst of a devastating and seemingly ill-advised war with Ukraine, we are all trying to unravel President Vladimir Putin’s strategy and motives. Is he recreating the former Soviet Union? Does he actually think Ukraine is a threat? Is he trying to thwart expansion of NATO? Is he mentally unbalanced? Is he modeling himself on Lenin and Stalin, intent on reintroducing their model of communism or at least authoritarianism?
All of these are possible. But perhaps we might understand him and his ambitions if we look much further into Russia’s past, a past that for many Russians in neither irrelevant in the modern world, nor, perhaps, even past. It is possible that Putin is channeling neither Lenin nor Stalin (OK, perhaps Stalin a little bit), but rather looking to the greatest of all Russian leaders, Peter the Great.
Peter the Great came to power as the Ottomans were beginning their long decline and the great European powers were striding across Europe and, indeed, the world. By all accounts, Russia was a backward country, devoted to its old ways. It lacked modern industry, a modern army and any semblance of a navy. It had only limited access to the sea and then only at the sufferance of other countries.
Its borders were continually threatened, not only by encroaching European empires, especially Sweden, but also by Persians, as well as Crimean Tartars and other Ottoman surrogates. Peter was particularly aware that his half-sister, Sophia, the regent initially in charge of him and his half-brother, Ivan, lost a great deal of power when she could not successfully repel Tartar raids into Russia’s southern lands.
One by one, Peter addressed each of these issues and, in many ways, created the Russia we know today. He reorganized and modernized the Russian army along western European lines. He fought the Crimean Khan and forced him to cede Kiev to Russia. He ultimately fought his way through the Ottoman Empire and secured the port of Azov, which laid the groundwork for the creation of the Imperial Russian Navy, a navy to rival many of the great European powers.
Perhaps most tellingly, he fought a long, multi-front war with Charles XII of Sweden. He was initially defeated in the early stages of the war, but finally began to prevail, at which point Charles turned his attention south and invaded Ukraine. Peter finally defeated Sweden in Ukraine and, in the bargain, Sweden abandoned Poland as well. That allowed Peter to orchestrate the restoration of the prior Polish king, who had been particularly friendly to Russia. Peter then moved on and took Livonia (which was the northern half of modern Latvia and the southern half of modern Estonia), driving Sweden back to Finland. He then drove the Swedes out of Finland as well.
Peter then turned his attention back to the Ottomans and the Persians. The Russo-Persian War drastically increased Russian influence in the Caspian Sea and the Caucus, not only securing the ports he so badly wanted, but reducing Ottoman influence and territorial gains on a permanent basis.
That is the history to which we most commonly pay attention, but there is more to the story. Despite spending considerable time in Europe, Peter could never secure any assistance from the European powers. France was aligned with the Ottomans, Austria wanted peace in the east so it could freely conduct its wars in the west and most other countries were consumed with the War of Spanish Succession. So no help from the west. Indeed, his greatest enemy was from the west, Charles XII, the young king of Sweden, whose territorial ambitions came right up to the border of Russia and perhaps beyond.
Perhaps even more interestingly, Peter chose not to occupy many of the territories he conquered. He ceded Poland back to the Poles. He gave considerable territory back to Persia. But for those countries that surrounded Russia, he insisted that friendly leaders be put in place. He did not exhibit the same kind of territorial empire-building ambitions seen in so many other major powers of the time, but he was ruthless in providing a secure buffer zone around his Russia. He defined the territorial boundaries of “Mother Russia,” but chose to expand them in only the most modest ways – to secure ports, to acquire Finnish land proximate to St. Petersburg, his glorious new capital.
Peter wanted to secure the territory of Mother Russia, but, beyond that, he was only interested in creating that buffer zone around Mother Russia. He did not want to occupy. He did not seem to have extensive ambitions to build an empire defined by territorial expansion well beyond Russia’s border. He was willing to let the countries surrounding Russia be independent as long as they were led by friendly and pliant rulers. Some wanted to proclaim him “Emperor of the East,” but he refused, accepting the more modest title of “Emperor of All Russia,” a title that more accurately described his goals and his ambitions.
What do we learn from all this? First, the West offered no help to Peter to protect Russia. Second, and perhaps most importantly, he did not have extensive territorial ambitions, but he wanted ports, he wanted a modern army, he wanted a navy, he wanted a Western-style industrial economy, he wanted respect from the West (he even went so far as to change sartorial and hirsutic practices, introduce a university and copy Western architecture), but most of all he wanted protection from territorial encroachments and a protective buffer zone around Mother Russia.
Peter the Great’s method of building and protecting Russia has long been admired in Russia. Even Stalin, no fan of the Tsars or Emperors, wrote of Peter, “who had to deal with more developed countries in the west, feverishly built works in factories for supplying the army and strengthening the country’s defenses, this was an original attempt to leap out of the framework of backwardness.” (Of course, it is entirely possible both Stalin and Putin also greatly admire the ferocity with which Peter put down even the slightest sign of rebellion or unrest.)
If any of this sounds familiar with respect to Putin, perhaps it is and perhaps that would allow us to rethink exactly what he is trying to accomplish and, perhaps, even how we might stop him.
Michael K. Young
Michael K. Young is a professor in the Bush School of Government and Public Service of Texas A&M University, president emeritus of Texas A&M University, as well as former president of the University of Washington and the University of Utah. He served as deputy under secretary for economic affairs and ambassador for trade and environmental affairs in the administration of President George H.W. Bush.