America's military strategy, its armed forces, and its defense budget matched up. Based on

this standard, the 2006 QDR is long on assertion and short on quantification. Defense

Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assures us that all the variables are aligned, but he gives us

little reason to believe.

The Congressional Budget Office has already cast doubt on the Pentagon's ability to deliver

its modernization plans within budget. Another area of concern is the match - or lack of it

- between planned forces and missions. Our manifest difficulties in Iraq make this more than

an academic issue.

The QDR says counter-insurgency and nation-building exercises are not easy to win

"swiftly" or "decisively." But this concession to reality does not lead Rumsfeld to

prescribe fewer such adventures for the future.

Instead, the QDR foresees increasing the demands on our military in these areas - and

almost every other as well.

The question is whether planned force enhancements are sufficient to support another

quantum leap in activity. For that matter, are forces sufficient to turn the tide in Iraq?

That is anyone's guess, because the document does not provide enough detail to allow clear

judgments. But our experience over the past few years argues against blind faith in

Rumsfeld's assurances.

The QDR divides military missions into two categories: "steady state" and "surge." With

regard to the first, it foresees an increase in counter-terror, counter-proliferation,

counter-insurgency, stability, and nation-building operations. It also suggests that our

military will be involved in more countries building partnerships with foreign military

establishments - and must routinely recruit, train, equip and maintain our forces.

Add to that big list "military transformation." This, too, must march steadily forward

down both new and familiar avenues. Units are supposed to re-orient globally while also

integrating a new generation of weapons, becoming better "networked," and improving their

capacities for irregular warfare.

Meantime, "surge activities" include responding to a catastrophic attack on the homeland

and being able to wage two nearly simultaneous larger-scale wars.

One new element in the 2006 QDR is that the two "big wars" may be either two conventional

campaigns or one conventional and counter-insurgency war, for example Iraq plus North Korea

(or maybe China). Of course, adding a big counter-insurgency war to the possible mix will boost requirements because the forces suitable for fighting two conventional wars would not

be entirely suitable for fighting one conventional war plus one irregular war.

When it addresses proposed force changes, the QDR calls for a reduction in active duty

personnel, down to the level set by the previous administration.

By various counts, this means a loss of between 60,000 and 75,000 personnel.

Of course, the Pentagon says it plans to use the remainder more efficiently.

As for "force enhancements," almost all of the previously planned "big ticket" items

have been spared the axe. If affordable, these will enhance conventional war-fighting

capabilities - at least those planned for the air forces. But the feasibility of the Army's

future weapon systems remains hotly contested. Also controversial are the Army's efforts to

squeeze 42 combat brigades out of the existing force of 33.

The real beef of immediate transformation - available within the next five years or so -

comes down to 14,000 special operations personnel (shifted from other duties) and 322

additional unmanned aerial vehicles.

But how does this add up to a match between missions and forces? That is a mystery, mostly.

So far, we can be sure of only one thing: The Pentagon will spend $2.5 trillion during the

next five years - not counting the incremental (added) cost of combat operations.

Understandably, we Americans may want to know more about how Secretary Rumsfeld plans to

spend our treasure and use our vital assets.

Several types of information would help close the credibility gap: first, the Pentagon

needs to show how it might allocate its assets to fulfill the expanded roster of "steady

state" activities, including training and transformation. And second, it needs to us show

how the proposed force might manage several types of "surge" situations - especially

complex ones involving multiple conflicts.

In this way, Rumsfeld can indicate the strength, flexibility and resilience of the force he

proposes. And once better informed, if we are not convinced, we might want to consider

different goals, a different strategy, different forces - or a different budget.

Carl Conetta is co-director of the Project on Defense Alternatives, a nonprofit think

tank focused on national security issues.