This is an archived article that was published on sltrib.com in 2016, and information in the article may be outdated. It is provided only for personal research purposes and may not be reprinted.

Recently, establishment Republicans raised the option of a brokered national convention as a deterrent to the Donald Trump insurgency. As the scenario goes, Trump's delegate strength would be whittled away after repeated ballots, allowing a compromise candidate to emerge for a November showdown with the Democrats.

Particularly valuable for gauging the "Never Trump" effort was the "Stop Goldwater" campaign waged during the 1964 Republican Party nomination process. It proves a cautionary tale for party elites.

The electoral war of 1964 pitted Arizona Sen. Barry Goldwater and the emerging conservative movement against the moderates of the Republican eastern establishment. Goldwater had railed against President Dwight Eisenhower for his refusal to roll back Democratic reforms and instead running a "dime store New Deal." Now Goldwater prepared to awaken sleeping conservatives in the South, Midwest and West to take back their party and then their country.

Running a methodical ground game, conservatives organized at the grassroots and captured precinct caucuses and state conventions, slowly harvesting the nominating delegates.

New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller accepted the establishment's mantle. He banked on a strong record, family connections and vast resources. It was no surprise that Rockefeller took his adversary lightly. What he failed to gauge was the bitterness in the provinces. To Goldwater's supporters, Rockefeller was the avatar of the hated Republican elite, its cosmopolitanism and its embracing of financial capitalism and Wall Street.

Pundits were eager to write off Barry Goldwater when he polled poorly in the New Hampshire primary. But the Arizona senator's delegate count continued to climb. The final showdown between the western insurgents and the eastern elite came in California at the end of May, when Goldwater eked out a victory in the winner take-all primary. His delegate count assured him a first ballot nomination.

But Republican insiders refused to surrender to the inevitable. When Rockefeller failed, former President Eisenhower secretly prodded Pennsylvania's Gov. William Scranton to enter the race. Ike believed that the party would unite behind Scranton, but he refused to make a public endorsement. Meanwhile, Rockefeller and Michigan Gov. George Romney enlisted in the Stop Goldwater cause. Scranton, with a base of support as Pennsylvania's favorite son, moved to pry delegates from the Arizonan's grip. He quickly realized the futility of his position, finding as Illinois Sen. Everett Dirksen observed, Goldwater's delegates were "tight as wallpaper."

This last ditch attempt to broker the convention infuriated the Arizonan. He decried the "stiletto" job and fumed at the "mysterious cabal." When Nelson Rockefeller appeared before the convention, conservatives could not contain their rage. Television captured the Goldwaterites shouting down Rockefeller and beating back all compromise. Goldwater's nomination put the Eastern Establishment in disarray and the party's moderate wing would never recover.

President Lyndon Johnson slaughtered Goldwater at the polls in November. Fear of nuclear war, the memory of a martyred president, and prosperity were critical factors in the outcome. So, too, were the open wounds of a primary season and convention that frustrated Republican unity.

Those who strategize a brokered 2016 convention must weigh rewards against risks. Victory will come at a price. If Donald Trump is denied the nomination despite his election victories, a backlash from the base will weaken any candidate going forward to November. Trump's defeat at the convention could also steel his supporters at the grassroots. As we know, Goldwater's defeat did not restore the party elite to influence.

There is also a lesson for the party that counts superdelegates. If Hillary Clinton wins on the basis of her support among the party's cadre, many Democrats will become disaffected. The Republican Party had a defining moment in 1964. The Democratic Party had its day of reckoning just four years later.

Robert A. Goldberg is a professor of history and director of the Tanner Humanities Center at the University of Utah.