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It would probably be accurate to attribute the very partisan debate over the Iran nuclear deal to the political season we are in. But this partisan response neglects lessons we have learned from a bipartisan policy of engaging Iran and North Korea in an effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and how refusing to negotiate with regimes that have nuclear ambitions has actually allowed North Korea to achieve some of its nuclear ambitions, but engaging Iran has blunted its development of a nuclear capability.

Many in Congress do not view diplomacy as essential to American strategy and often dismiss diplomacy as something only weak states engage in — strong states do what they want to do and weak states have to negotiate. But diplomacy is essential and poor diplomacy has contributed to setbacks for the United States around the world. This is especially obvious in the realm of political-military strategy, where we have seen how overly politicized and militarily misguided undertakings have resulted in bad strategic outcomes.

After much congressional criticism and politicking, the anti-Iran nuclear lobby, including the unprecedented lobbying effort by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu before a joint session of Congress, could not muster enough votes to stop President Obama from moving forward with implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) — the Iran nuclear deal in which "Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons."

This agreement has averted a war and may initiate a diplomatic process of bringing Iran in from the international wilderness. We can already see this with Iran's inclusion in discussions of the Syrian imbroglio.

This year is the 10th anniversary of the Joint Statement signed with North Korea in an effort to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons. North Korea pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons development program and rejoin the Non Proliferation Treaty in exchange for the U.S. respecting North Korea's right to develop peaceful nuclear technology. That agreement has demonstrably failed.

The failure to prevent North Korea from developing nuclear weapons is a bipartisan failure. Initially in 1994, President Clinton negotiated with North Korea and achieved some success curbing Pyongyang's progress toward developing a bomb. President Bush rejected Clinton's engagement policy and worked to isolate North Korea, labeling it a member of the "axis of evil." North Korea, isolated and ostracized, continued its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. Unable to stop North Korea's push toward nuclear capability, Bush changed course and joined the Six Party Talks in 2003 and resulted in the Joint Statement in 2005. Pyongyang agreed to end efforts to produce nuclear weapons and eliminate existing weapons, rejoin the NPT and observe IAEA safeguards; the U.S. promised not to attack North Korea and to seek to normalization of relations. Progress came unwound by the end of the Bush presidency.

President Obama did not push to resume the Six Party Talks and, in May 2009, North Korea carried out an underground nuclear test and in February 2013 carried out its third nuclear test.

The stakes are very high. Even Japan feels the increasing threat from North Korea and is considering constitutional revisions that would allow developing its own military capability to counter the missile threat from North Korea.

We, along with our allies and the Chinese, can continue to develop missile defenses and other capabilities to deter North Korea, but this all leads to a much less stable and war-prone world. It would be better to re-initiate the Six-Party Talks in an attempt to facilitate the denuclearization of North Korea, like we were able to do with Iran. North Korea will not be enthusiastic about giving up its nuclear weapons, but as negotiations with Iran have proven, coming in from the cold of international isolation is enticing in exchange for relinquishing nuclear weapons.

One lesson we learn from these two cases is that we must mistrust these rogue regimes and verify their compliance with agreements. Another lesson we learn is that imposing onerous sanctions and isolating these regimes only results in continued bad behavior. The lack of attention to these history lessons results less optimal outcomes.

A successful foreign policy, in this case specifically the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation, requires abandoning idealistic goals and embracing a realistic understanding of past precedents and the national interest.

Eric Hyer is an associate professor of political science and coordinator for Asian Studies at Brigham Young University.