"We had an opportunity to have not approved the [mining] plan and clearly we had a responsibility in that regard and we did not meet that responsibility," acting Assistant Labor Secretary Richard Stickler said in an interview.
But others must share in the blame for the tragedy, he said, including the mine operator, Genwal Resources Inc., which is co-owned by Murray Energy and Utah-based Intermountain Power Agency, and its engineering firm, Agapito Associates Inc.
"This thing started all the way back with the mine design," Stickler said.
MSHA's accident investigation issued Thursday found the mine's engineering left it "primed for a massive pillar collapse," a situation aggravated when the operator mined areas that were off-limits and did not report three previous coal outbursts, where pressure bearing down caused coal to explode from the pillars supporting the mine, signaling serious stability problems.
"So it was a combination of all these things together," Stickler said.
A Labor Department investigation, released Thursday evening, painted a dismal picture of MSHA's handling of Crandall Canyon, from a shoddy review of the mining plan, to the failure to take charge of family and media briefings.
Rep. George Miller, D-Calif.Â, chairman of the House Education and Labor Committee, said the reports show MSHA failed to do its job. Earlier this year, the committee studied the disaster and held hearings before issuing its own statement on how it happened and why.
"The agency's track record . . . leads me to believe that MSHA is not up to the task of protecting the health and safety of our nation's miners," Miller said Thursday. "We must ensure that another tragedy such as this never happens again."
Mike Dalpiaz, international vice president for the United Mine Workers of America said that, as much as anyone, MSHA failed to do its job.
"They approved it all. They gave the nod to everything they said [in the report] was terrible," he said. "So, hell yeah. They deserve the blame. They could have stopped that thing in its tracks."
However, Stickler took issue with several criticisms leveled by the Labor Department's investigators. Specifically, he said:
* The supervisor in charge of the review of the Crandall Canyon mine plan has 30 years experience in Western mining. He did not know how to use computer models to test the mine's stability;
* There was a clear chain of command for the post-accident rescue efforts;
* It would have been inappropriate for him to refute misstatements mine co-owner Bob Murray made during media briefings until all the facts were clear, or to debate with him publicly;
* Inspectors did all of the required inspections of the mine, but their work was hampered because the mine operator concealed the three coal outbursts in March and August;
* And, although MSHA did not do a formal risk assessment during the rescue, supervisors were constantly taking risk into account.
"I've never been aware of a formal risk assessment," Stickler said. "When you're in the middle of an emergency . . . like at Crandall Canyon, you have no facilities. The sheriff brought us a tent. We're in the rain part of the time. And you're going to say, 'OK, let's huddle up and have a formal risk assessment?' ''
All told, MSHA agreed to take action on many of the 81 recommendations the Labor report made.
For example, it now requires a more rigorous review and analysis by technical experts of plans to mine in deep, bump-prone areas, and has mandated thorough, monthly inspections of every mine in the country doing retreat mining.
